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INTRODUCTION
It is widely agreed that social networking is one of the most popular methods
of communication in today’s world. One of the world’s most prevalent and popular
social networking sites (hereinafter SNS) is Facebook; “Facebook holds about 130
million active users, and it is the fourth most trafficked website in the world” 1.
According to Mike Sachoff and a new survey from Prompt Communications,
“Facebook is now the most popular communication tool, followed by SMS and
email.2 ” “Facebook, Inc. operates as a social networking company worldwide. The
company builds tools that enable users to connect, share, discover, and
communicate with each other; enables developers to build social applications on
Facebook or to integrate their websites with Facebook; and offers products that
enable advertisers and marketers to engage with its users. As of February 2, 2012, it
had 845 million monthly users and 443 million daily users. 3”

1

Dunn, Haley B. "Facebook & Other Social Networking Sites: Candy‐ Coating Surveillance."
Commentary: The University of New Hampshire Student Journal of Communication, 2008. Web. 30
Jan. 2012. <http://www.unh.edu/communication/media/pdf/commentary/spring09.pdf#page=89>.
2 Sachoff, Mike. "Survey Finds Facebook Most Popular Communication Tool." WebProNews.
WebProNews/Business, 11 Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Feb. 2012. <http://www.webpronews.com/survey‐
finds‐facebook‐most‐popular‐communication‐tool‐2009‐12>
3

"Company Overview of Facebook, Inc." Bloomberg Business Week. Web. 3 Mar. 2012.

Many individuals have readily adapted to use this form of communication media,
however there are countries that restrict their citizens’ level of access to certain
websites, and Facebook is a primary target.
The Reporters Without Borders group has published its annual list of
"internet enemies" that it considers unfairly restrict internet freedom.
Censorship, harassment, lack of freedom of expression and repression of
bloggers are all mentioned as reasons for a country being on the "roll of
shame. Overall 13 countries have been collated including China, Egypt,
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and North Korea. In addition the group noted
censorship in: Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Vietnam. 4
In doing so these countries, and China specifically, continue to impose limitations
upon their citizen’s access to the World Wide Web, and censors their ability to
readily communicate on an international basis. Further, these countries impose
restrictions on the information that can be posted and shared online, including
social network sites and companies such as RenRen in China, which operate under
restrictions and monitoring imposed by the Government. Social networking has
become an important method for communication and information sharing, because
it enables information to easily be shared and made available to millions of online
users.
Use of online social networking in China is at its highest percentage of

<http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=20765463
03‐51‐46‐dare4more.tumblr.gif>.
4

"List Released of Countries That Restrict Web Access." Informed. Ihotdesk, 7 Nov. 2006. Web.
<Lhttp://www.ihotdesk.com/article/17919092/List%20released%20of%20countries%20that%20restrict%2
0web%20access>.

participation among college and high school students, and use is continuing to grow
and expand to other age groups. Chinese college students predominantly use
RenRen, commonly known as China’s Facebook, as their social networking site
because the usage of Facebook is banned in China5 6. However, when Chinese
students enter the United States and are immersed in this country’s foreign culture,
they have the opportunity to encounter and experience different online social
systems that operate more openly with limited legal restrictions and little
government intervention, such as Facebook. It is the hypothesis of this research
report that the combination of American cultural influence and the experience of
using a SNS that is free of government restriction regarding posted and shared
information will affect and change the participants’ online behavior(s). This study
will survey and investigate the on‐line habits of Chinese students who have been
living and studying at Union College for at least six months, and will compare their
primary usage of the Social Networks RenRen and Facebook. This research solicits
self‐provided responses, of Chinese students attending Union College, to a
questionnaire designed to answer questions like: do they believe feel their SNS
behavior has changed? If so, then has their sense of community or social network
changed? This study considers the reasons they choose to use one network over the
other, if they serve different purposes, and how frequently they visit Facebook
and/or RenRen. Lastly, how aware are the students of cultural and political factors
5

Pesek, William. "Mark Zuckerberg and the 'friending' of China." Brisbane Times. National Times, 27
Feb. 2012. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-and-thefriending-of-china-20120226-1tw90.html>.
6 . CHAO, LORETTA. "Mr. Zuckerberg Goes to China." The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company,
23 Dec. 2010. Web. 29 Feb. 2012.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703814804576035143409583806.html>.

that influence their use of SNS? The results of this study anticipate that the
surveyed Chinese students are active Facebook users who have change their online
behavior, now that they are afforded the opportunity to become part of an online
community where they can provide online information and post more openly on
Facebook than on RenRen, because there is an absence of governmental control and
censorship. Additionally, “while the Internet is notorious for its digital dens of
deception, on Facebook, what you see tends to be what you get…online social
networks are so popular and so likely to reveal people’s actual personalities because
they allow for social interactions that feel real in many ways;7” this supports the
claim that Facebook users freely express themselves by providing real personal
information.

LIMITATIONS
Limitations to this study consist of the lack of previous research on social
networking, especially studies comparing the networks RenRen and Facebook, and
while I would have liked to personally interview each participant, time and
academic constraints unfortunately dictate that the best method to conduct the
survey is to distribute a questionnaire via email to twenty Chinese exchange
students currently attending Union College.
Additionally, having lived in China for six months, I have limited but

7 Bower, Bruce. "Facebook Users Are the Real Thing." JSTOR. Science News, 2010. Web. 29 Feb. 2012.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25656111?&Search=yes&searchText=facebook&list=hide&searchUri=%2Fac
tion%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dfacebook%26gw%3Djtx%26acc%3Don%26prq%3Dadvantages%2
Bto%2Bfacebook%26Search%3DSearch%26hp%3D25%26wc%3Don&prevSearch=&item=9&ttl=559&re
turnArticleService=showFullText>.

previous exposure to aspects of Chinese culture and traditions, and feel
somewhat biased in my predictions of what I expect this research to reveal. My
time in China was a wonderful experience, yet there were two instances during
my stay where I felt the impact of the government’s online censorship power and
control. One illustrative example was this past summer when I worked as an
intern for IBM at their China Research Lab in Beijing. At the lab I was supervised
by the psychology department and asked to research privacy management issues
on SNSs in China and the United States. This assignment involved the need to
conduct research regarding Facebook and its offered privacy tools and features,
and it was necessary to access Facebook. Originally, I thought I would have no
problem accessing Facebook even in China, because I was working for a famous
international company conducting research in an attempt to understand the
online populations better, and learn the reasons behind “user” privacy behaviors.
However, I was unable to access Facebook through any of the proxy outlets that I
was given at IBM, and if I hadn’t previously been to China and through Union
College installed a “Cisco Any Connect VPN Client” (VPN), then I would not have
been able to access Facebook and conduct my research. This was quite a shock
to me that an American company like IBM could not have their China based
operations access Facebook. I thought, “who (at home) would believe the
Chinese government has so much control over the media?” Facebook is not
readily accessible in China because it will not agree to the prohibitions over
information sharing and governmental monitoring required to operate in China.
Therefore, the Chinese government has refused to permit Facebook from being

used in China.
“Mr. Zuckerberg has expressed interest in the China market, though
he notes that it is a market that “is extremely complex and has its own
dynamics,” and noted there are only four countries where “Facebook
isn’t yet or on a path to win: China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.”
He also observed that while “Facebook values openness it has made
exceptions in some markets including Germany and Pakistan, where
Nazi content and depictions of Muhammad are seen as offensive and
are outlawed. Mr. Zuckerberg also expressed the desire to find a way
to enter China “on our terms,” an idea that hasn’t worked out so well
for other foreign Internet companies8.
This experience, along with a situation when I was at Fudan University in
Shanghai, and attempted to check employment opportunities with the Central
Intelligence Agency, made me feel censored. Immediately after researching the CIA
website, I came to realize that my internet server was suddenly frozen and all my
computer functions became paralyzed for ten minutes; a demonstration of the
internet control the Chinese government exercises, and of the “cyber police’s”
activity monitoring my web search. “There are as many as 30,000 in one estimate,
of cyber police squads patrolling Chinese cyberspace, deleting politically incorrect
content in real time, blocking websites, monitoring networking activities of citizens
and tracking down and arresting offending individuals”9. I suspect that my CIA
research flagged their attention. Research findings show that while the creation of
the internet has provided individuals in China with a means to communicate,
distribute information, and even make public statements, it simultaneously has
8

Chao, Loretta, and Yoli Zhang. "Zuckerberg in China: Huzzahs from Users, Hush from Alibaba." Wall
Street Journal. China Real Time Report, 2010. Web. 05 Mar. 2012.
<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/12/23/zuckerberg-in-china-huzzahs-from-users-hush-fromalibaba/>.
9 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.

given the Chinese government the ability to monitor its citizens’ online activities in
their efforts to maintain a social order that coincides with their Communist Party
worldview10.
LITERATURE REVIEW
China’s Internet media has advanced at a rapid pace since its implementation
in the 1990’s, when China and its citizens went from having little contact with the
outside world, to engaging in the global market, where they were introduced to
electronic media products and services like social network sites, mobile telephones,
i‐Pods, and the world wide web; products which interested many people. “The mass
media serves as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general
populace. It is their function to muse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate
individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them
into the institutional structures of the larger society”11. As China’s economy began
its transition into a modern market, this function became more attractive as its
government grew fearful its citizens would develop knowledge and information that
might empower them to revolt or undermine the Communist Party’s campaigns,
ideas, and mandate to rule12. For example, the Chinese government was so
concerned about loss of power in 2003, when Rupert Murdoch, media expert,
“pronounced that satellite television would bring the end to authoritarian regimes

10

Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
11 Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. "Media and Cultural Studies." A Propaganda Model (2001):
280-306. Print.
12 Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.

everywhere, that they (Chinese government) had him coach the top Chinese leaders
at the Central Party School in Beijing on how to calculatedly liberalize the Chinese
media market for domestic and global capital, ensuring them that the potential of
the open market doesn’t represent any loss of power.13” Due to this worry of losing
power and the corresponding intensified effort to control media access and
dissemination of information, the struggle for control continues today.
The Chinese government regularly takes advantage of the media and
manages the media by manipulating them (the “media giant” companies) into
following a special agenda and framework that coincides with the government’s
standards14. Not only does the government exercise its authority by influencing
media based businesses into complying with their commands, including
management of internet sites, but they also impose party propaganda disciplines on
individuals who criticize the Communist Party committee. In fact, since the Chinese
government has seen such great success in managing media production and
distribution, “the party has been able to strengthen the structural management of
the media through specialized government agencies.”15 The Chinese government
monitors all internet content and restricts on‐line journalists from writing about

13

Zhao, Yuezhi, and Robert A. Hackett. "Democratizing Global Media." Who Want Democracy and Does
It Deliver Food? Communication and Power in a Globally Integrated China: 57-75. Print.
14 Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. "Media and Cultural Studies." A Propaganda Model (2001):
280-306. Print.
15 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.

issues regarding human rights, democracy, or freedom of belief, in order to ensure
the stability of their communist society and avoid potential threats16.
The Chinese government maintains control over the nation’s media
networks, and the flow of information made available to its people. Because much of
the media’s information is regulated, several websites are customized or censored.
“Citizens have come to realize that there are forbidden topics in domestic media
such as press freedom and China’s suppression of this liberal aspiration,” which are
not to be dialogued or researched17. In effect, if on‐line users “dare to communicate
unsanctioned information and promote dissenting ideas, then they are prosecuted
under the criminal offences of ‘disclosing state secrets,’ inciting to subvert state
power”, and “endangering national security.”18 It is this fear of being monitored and
potentially prosecuted that may explain why many Chinese users censor their
behavior online and self‐impose restrictions.
Many online users, including journalists, are well aware that they can receive
jail sentences, be physically harmed, and be subjected to harassment if they publicly
write or speak about any sort of politically incorrect remark(s). While most citizens
suffer in silence and long to speak out freely, others have risked punishment and
retribution, some even sacrificed their lives in the attempt to report sensitive news
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Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
17 Zhao, Yuezhi, and Robert A. Hackett. "Democratizing Global Media." Who Wants Democracy and Does
It Deliver Food? Communication and Power in a Globally Integrated China: 57-75. Print.
18 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.

topics, which usually means politically based news content19. “On the ground, the
police and, increasingly, thugs hired by local authorities detain and obstruct
reporters, confiscate [journalists] audio and videotapes, and harass or even beat
them when they try to interview protesters.”20 The government has and will
continue to use punitive measures in order to silence negative information or
criticism pertaining to the CCP and the Government. In order to diminish the
negative information flow on the web, the Chinese government has created a list of
categories that are prohibited by anyone from being disclosed; if individuals do
publish such information they can expect to suffer consequences, some potentially
severe. For example, topics like: protests, gathering of the masses, undermining
social stability, disturbing social order, demonstrations, etc. are all forbidden from
being published online21.
The Chinese government wants to regulate and manage the largest
social groups in its country; therefore, they are less interested in
regulating the elite’s Internet access due to the fact that China’s
population mostly consists of the lower and middle classes22. The
government wants to make sure “that the vast majority of citizens do
not get unfiltered access. Communication has never simply been
about an issue of free expression. It has always been an integral part
of political organization and social mobilization.23
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Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
20 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
21 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
22 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
23 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.

The lower class makes up the largest portion of China’s people and subsequently
they are a target group of concern regarding use of the Internet. The government
monitors every facet of the Internet and prevents access to uncensored information;
“Facebook is also blocked inside China, due to government concerns that the social
networking system could be a portal for Chinese citizens to see a different way of
life and thus disrupt "social harmony.24"
On the other hand, they use the fundamental tool of “vagueness” to instill
uncertainty and fear in its users, adding self‐censorship to their word of
control25. “There are four principal advantages the government gains with this
policy of “vagueness:” (1) the potential of facing vague accusations to intimidate
people (internet users) into moderating their behavior, (2) subtle but effective
pressure causes many people to control their behavior to a greater extent, (3)
being vague is “useful in maximizing what can be learned during forced
confessions,” and (4) it allows authorities to zero in on whomever they want.26”
One may argue that these principals of control play a prominent role to the
degree that citizens have an “online fear‐factor” about the government, which in
turn inhibits them from disclosing all types of information online. While China
has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it is still very clear it
“holds one of the most oppressive regimes in using coercive state powers to

24

Eaton, Kit. "Zuckerberg's Taking Facebook Into China, But It'll Be a Baidu Beast | Fast Company."
FastCompany.com. 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 05 Mar. 2012. <http://www.fastcompany.com/1746392/facebookchina-baidu-social-networking>.
25 Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.
26 Hassid, Jonathan. "Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business." Asian Survey 48.3 (2008):
414-30. JSTOR. Web. 20 Jan. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414>.

control public communication”27. What’s more, this is occurring during a time of
accelerated capitalistic style development, where China and its people are
evermore frequently facing ideological conflicts over tradition and culture,
societal norms, and political ideals.
Chinese citizens, and in particular social networking users, typically don’t
disclose personal thoughts or information online due to fear of losing their Internet
privileges and of being identified as one of the government’s “targets” for Internet
surveillance, where they can be subjected to punitive actions; “most users are
unwilling to express their feelings about the party or the government on‐and‐offline
due to officials’ threats of harsh punishment.28” Due to the evolution of the Internet
and technology, when a person does attempt to produce online sensitive content,
they face
…”increasing sophisticated firewalls and filtering software, where the
survival time for offensive content in cyberspace has been reduced
from thirty minutes to just a few. In December of 2004, China’s
General Agency of Press and Publication (GAPP) announced the
establishment of a ‘24‐Hour Real Time Web‐Publishing Content
Reading and Monitoring Mechanism.’ In addition to serving the
censorship function, this system is also charged with the
responsibility of gathering and analyzing intelligence regarding the
general ideological and content orientation of web publishing.”29

27

Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
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Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.
29 Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.

The Chinese government has a significant degree of power over the entire media
system; therefore, with the increasing importance placed on the Internet, the
Chinese citizen’s worry of producing inappropriate content online is well founded.
In practice it is best for the public to say nothing and to keep their opinions to
themselves, otherwise they could end up with significant consequences, as other
citizens have already experienced. Failing to abide by the Chinese government’s
internet regulations may result similarly to a case during 2003 and 2004 “where as
many as seventeen internet activists were tried and punished with jail sentences up
to fourteen years, making China the top country for jailing internet activists”30. This
is an illustration of how the government exercises their authority over the Chinese
people, who have no power, and demonstrates the scope of their control over
China’s cyberspace.
According to Yuezhi Zhao’s Reconfiguring Party‐State Power, “the role of the
Chinese government in micromanaging media structure and disciplining the media
has been significantly expanded along with the role of repressive state apparatuses
such as the police and the courts in the prosecution of dissent.31” The Chinese
government has been successful in its efforts to control the information flow
between people outside of China with people inside of China, and to suppress
Chinese citizens from publically criticizing the Communist Party through the

30

Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.
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establishment of its propaganda disciplines. Through its laws and regulations, it is
clear the government’s goal for governing all media operations, including the
Internet, is to lessen the threat to their authoritarian regime, retain traditional levels
of propaganda control, prohibit the empowerment of citizens, maintain social
stability, and confirm that Internet users don’t “deviate from the official Communist
party doctrine. This includes the Four Cardinal Principals: Socialism, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism‐
Leninism‐Mao Zedong thought.32” While the party has many methods of surveillance
for the media, they have also been successful in promoting self‐censorship.
According to Jongpil Chung, author of Comparing Online Activities in China and South
Korea: The Internet and the Political Regime, there are two strategies to repress
politically sensitive or “subversive” content online. The first refers to technical
methods that involve the cyber police and legal regulations enabling screening of
online content. The second is where the government implements various types of
surveillance and takes punitive actions to boost the public’s self‐censorship33. Some
business owners are so fearful for being held responsible and liable for
inappropriate content online that they hire alternative workers to monitor their
networks information. Literature shows that “most online users are unwilling to
express their feelings about the Communist party or the government on‐and‐off‐line
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Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.
33 Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.

due to officials’ threats of harsh punishment”34. These, along with several other
factors, are the reasons responsible for the general Chinese online population’s
restricted behavior and self‐censorship. However, as people continue their efforts
and attempts in gathering previously inaccessible information, the government will
continue to impose new laws in their endeavor to maintain media control.
METHODOLOGY AND WORK PLAN
This study is based on a heuristic questionnaire consisting of subject matter
with regard to Chinese students’ online user behavior on the social network system
Facebook, while they are in the United States, and literature reviews pertaining to
the cyber social networking world. While conducting extensive research on social
network systems, with specific attention being directed to information relating to
China’s RenRen and America’s Facebook, I learned that the Chinese populations
impose a measure of self‐imposed restriction of information disclosure regarding
their online behavior. A focused questionnaire was devised to explore whether
Chinese students, from the ages of eighteen to twenty two who are living in the USA
and studying at Union College, changed their online habits as a result of western
cultural influences, and if governmental censure or oversight influenced the kind or
amount of personal information they shared. Several online articles and journals,
written by native Chinese and Westerners, provide information as to how China’s
online population self censor their behavior regarding expression, and analyze the
reasons for insight why the Chinese users behave in this manner.
34
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As for the questionnaire, twenty Chinese students were electronically sent the
survey via e‐mail. In order to ascertain whether the student’s online behaviors have
changed since they left China and came to the USA, I asked questions such as: how
do you use Facebook, do you think RenRen and Facebook basically serve the same
function, and do you think that you have experienced change and now share more
information on Facebook than you did previously? The results and findings
developed as a result of this human studies project are understood to only be
preliminary, as only five students completed and returned the questionnaire;
respondent participation being 25 percent, but of a very small sample population.
My goal is to gain an understanding of how the Chinese students act when they are
integrated into a new cultural context, one in which the government plays a less
prominent role in monitoring personal online behavior. This study will help convey
the participants’ knowledge and opinions regarding online censorship in China, and
discover if they are even aware of how excessive censoring online material has
become. Once all of the participants’ data is compiled and analyzed, I will use the
response information, along with literature reviews, to demonstrate support or
rejection regarding my hypothesis.

BODY OF WORK
Questions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Participant
1
8/2011
Four Years
Freshman
20
Yes
B,C
Yes
Less
Yes
Yes
B,yes

Participant
2
9/2010
Four Years
Sophomore
21
Yes
A, B,C,D
Yes
Less
Yes
Yes
A,B,C,D,

12
13

D
A,B,C

D
A,B,C,D

14
15
16
17
18
19

B
No
No
No
No
No

C
No
No
No
No
No

20
21

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Participant
3
8/2011
Four Years
Freshman
19
Yes
A,B,C
Yes
Less
Yes
Yes
A,yes‐b,yes‐
d,yes‐e,yes
D
A,B

Participant
4
9/2011
Four Years
Freshman
18
Yes
B, C
Yes
The same
No
Yes
B,C,D,E

Participant
5
9/2008
Four Years
Senior
22
Yes
D
Yes
The same
No
Yes
B,yes

D
B,C,D

C
No
No‐c
Yes‐ a,b
Yes
Yes, has
explanation
No
Yes

B
No
No‐a,b,c
No‐a,b,c
No
No

D
B,C
D
C
No
No
Yes‐ a
Yes
No

Yes
No
No, has
No
explanation

This section of the report focuses on the self‐reported questionnaire results
and analyzes the participants’ behavior towards Facebook. This aspect of the report
reflects only preliminary findings, as the response rate was five returned
questionnaires out of a possible twenty returns, (a twenty five percent response
rate) which would ordinarily allow findings to be projected with more certainty;
this is not the case when the sample size and respondent numbers are so small.

Nevertheless, the preliminary findings will contribute to further research efforts,
and pose additional questions and issues to be probed in subsequent research. Out
of the five individual respondents who have self‐reported their attitudes and
behaviors on Facebook, three are freshmen, one is a sophomore, and one is a senior.
As I began reviewing their survey responses, I found it interesting to note that the
three freshman responses are similar to each other and different from the other two
participants; this could be a result of the fact they have spent less time in the United
States compared to the other students, as they have yet to complete their second
trimester at Union College.
ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANT RESPONSES
All of the students arrived at Union College in August or September of their
freshman year and all intend to complete four years of education; their ages are
from 18 to 22 years old. All participants used the Chinese SNS RenRen prior to
coming to the United States and all generally report its primary use was to: gather
information about friends, to share information, and to express themselves. Now the
participants use RenRen either the same (two participants) or less (three
participants) amount, and they all joined Facebook and are frequent users (five
participants) reporting daily, if not more often. Two of the three freshman and the
sophomore reported being able to access Facebook in China, which I interpret to
mean they apparently had access to some proxy outlet that provided them entry to
the SNS site without coming to the attention and notice of China’s cyber‐police.
Considering the Chinese restriction of Facebook, it seems a reasonable assumption

that the proxy must have provided secure assess, since the censors appear not to
have targeted or terminated the students’ activity. However, another possibility
may also be that they simply did not bother because the content was not deemed
problematic. It has been be reported that “(a)s far as the Internet goes the
government is only interested in making sure that the vast majority do not get
unfiltered access. Communication has never simply been an issue of free expression.
It has always been an integral part of political organization and social
mobilization.35”
It is difficult to accurately identify the primary reason the students had for
joining Facebook, because instead of selecting only one reason as requested, there
were a total of fourteen responses in total. However, the choice “to gather
information about friends and events” was cited by each of the five students, while
“to easily communicate and express myself with friends” received three responses
and the remaining three choices each received two responses. Regarding how
Facebook is used, all five again selected “gather information about friends and
events,” and then four students also cited “share information and express myself to
friends.” “Expanding our social network and making friends,” and “easily
communicate electronically with friends” were both cited three times.
I was somewhat surprised when I analyzed responses to the next few
questions. From my research, and my limited visits to China, I anticipated some
respondents would report they controlled the degree of personal information
35
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disclosed by “self‐imposed restriction,” yet none reported using this method, rather
all five rely on Facebook privacy tools; two relying on the standard “default”
settings, while three reported they “make changes and customize the privacy
settings to meet my needs.” I was particularly surprised that all five respondents
reported that governmental control over a social network service is not an influence
over their decision regarding posting personal information; it seems to be contrary
to my literature review, which would suggest that there is concern about disclosing
personal information in China due to the government’s constant monitoring.
However, all five again reflected that the fact that no governmental censorship of
Facebook postings in the United States has no bearing or influence of these
respondents’ use of Facebook.
Is it possible that none of these five participants are aware of how extensive
and restrictive China’s control is over the Internet and its media? Perhaps they are
aware and this doesn’t bother them—as the Chinese government guidelines are
continually in the news making these students aware of the fact that the Chinese
government has in the past, and continues to engage in stringent Internet use and
content regulation, which includes oversight and supervision of the public’s use.
The Internet Society of China (ISC) was founded in May 2001. It is a
national organization of the Internet industry with a remit for serving
the development of that industry, netizens and the decisions of the
government. The ISC has issued a series of self‐disciplinary
regulations, including the Public Pledge of Self‐regulation and
Professional Ethics for the China Internet Industry, Provisions of Self‐
regulation on not spreading Harmful Information for Internet
Websites, Public Pledge of Self‐regulation on Anti‐malicious Software,
Public Pledge of Self‐regulation on Blog Service, Public Pledge of Self‐
regulation on Anti‐Internet Virus, Declaration of Self‐regulation on

Copyright Protection of China's Internet Industry, and other
regulations, which greatly promote the healthy development of the
Internet.36
These pledges are efforts of the Chinese government to greatly promote the healthy
development of the internet by making appropriate conduct known. The above lists
are examples of online topics members must constantly be mindful of to avoid
coming into negative contact with the government. Perhaps these students are
unconcerned about any monitoring because their postings are essentially innocuous
and of little interest or concern to any governmental entity. Regardless, the
question of if, and how, Chinese students may be affected by governmental internet
control and posting of personal information is an area warranting further research,
at a deeper level with a statistically viable sample population, that will allow
projections to be made regarding the actions and opinions of the larger population
of college students. Regarding whether the method of selecting friends on RenRen
and Facebook differed, two respondents answered yes, and both students reported
they “accept requests from fellow students I have met,” and one also noted
acceptance of “requests from all Union College students.” Of the three students
saying their method for accepting friends did not change, one student then went on
to also chose each of three reasons for accepting a Facebook friend.
A discrepancy was noted in question 18 when two respondents, a freshman
and the senior, said yes that “cultural influences cause you (them personally) to
restrict the amount of personal identifiable information you make on line,” and to
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which three said no; yet at question 14 none of the students reported there was any
“self‐imposed restriction” regarding disclosure of personal information. Absent a
potential misunderstanding over “disclosing personal information” in Q‐14, versus
“personal identifiable information” in Q‐18, I cannot reconcile the difference.
Research has suggested that cultural collectivism influences Chinese people to value
group orientation over individual expression, and that self‐discipline is practiced to
restrict the degree of personal information disclosed. Still, considering the
unanimous denial answering question 14 and three of the five students denying a
cultural influence, it seems to suggest that any cultural influences may have a
minimal effect.
Only one of the five respondents answered Question 19 by saying yes, that
he/she thinks they have experienced change coming to the United States and that
they share more information than they do on RenRen; that student stated “I have
more American friends now and want to share my experience with them on
Facebook.” [Refer to attached Chart]. Regarding whether Chinese users would
“share more information in China if Facebook was available and operated in the
same manner as the United States, without governmental control or censorship,”
two students said yes and three said no; but one that answered no was the student
from Question 19, who said he/she shares more information on Facebook than they
do on RenRen. It seems somewhat contrary for this respondent to say Chinese
users would not share more information given the same opportunity in China, when
that is what this student has done in the United States; wouldn’t other Chinese
online users behave in the same manner if given the opportunity, especially as this

respondent stated RenRen and Facebook serve the same function. In the final
question three respondents thought RenRen and Facebook basically serve the same
functions while two did not; one of them (Participant four) explained …
“RenRen has more information than Facebook. We can easily see
articles, pictures and videos on RenRen. We can also write blogs,
listen to radios and get presents from RenRen Company. RenRen also
acts as a platform for people to talk about important stuff happens in
our country. The flow of information is very quick on RenRen. Also it
is somewhat like an Internet supervisor of the government. It reveals
the bad side of the society and makes netizens think deeply about the
human nature and arises people’s justice and care for others. RenRen
provides different topics for people to talk about. For example, it is
Chinese New Year now, the status column will automatically appear
these words: ‘what is your wishes for the New Year? Please write
down your wishes for your family and friends.’ Take another example,
when China was undergoing the big earthquake several years ago,
RenRen status column will show these words ‘let’s pray for people
who are now suffering from the earthquake.’ Also you can find articles
about how to learn English or Spanish, the experience of Chinese
students studying abroad and so on. RenRen is not just a network for
people meeting new friends; it also involves politics, sociology
anthropology and is more like a big information platform.”
This student’s response demonstrates some of the differences provided between
RenRen and Facebook’s features. However, experienced Facebook users would
argue that they too have the ability to easily see articles, photos and videos, as well
as read and share important information or any information they choose for that
matter with their online friends. Consequently, it seems possible, if not probable,
that this user is not fully aware of all of Facebook’s features, and doesn’t seem to
fully grasp its online culture. It is interesting to note, this participant mentioned
RenRen “provides different topics for people to talk about,” in fact a feature
Facebook does not offer, however the motivation behind the reasons why RenRen
and its staff might supply “topics to talk about” would easily be a topic for debate,

considering what the research has revealed about China’s monitoring and censoring
activities.
I also noted that the freshman (Participant four) provided some conflicting
responses; answering question 18 and 19 saying “no” if “cultural influences cause
you to restrict the amount of personal identifiable information you make available
on‐line,” and that this student did not believe he/she had “experienced change and
now share more information on Facebook than you did previously.” In light of these
responses, it then becomes confusing why this user would answer “yes” to question
20, which asked, “do you think if Facebook were available in China and operated in
the same manner as the United States, including no governmental control or
censorship, that Chinese users would share more personal information and
communicate more openly online?” Perhaps the inconsistent responses reflect
thinking that Chinese people may attach more importance to cultural limitations
regarding self disclosure, or they might somehow be more concerned about the
government knowing or potentially being aware of information they would post;
there is no way of knowing the underlying basis to why particular answers were
reported.
As previously mentioned in the limitation section of the report, there were
time constraints and conflicting demands that precluded pursuing personal
interviews that would have enabled me to delve into the “thought process” and
reasons underlying particular beliefs of some of the students. According to Jongpil
Chung, China exerts the most rigorous Internet censorship in the world and employs

strong, sophisticated control over what its people read, see and hear. The Chinese
government is obsessed with ensuring that its people have access to the “correct”
information that supports the state’s propaganda37. It seems compelling to believe
that when a government intends to control what people read, it must also control
what others say; these new instantaneous electronic communication capabilities of
the internet, including blogs, social network systems, are increasingly important
targets of such control.
DOES TIME OUTSIDE CHINA MAKE A DIFFERENCE
A particular question of interest during this research was to examine
whether or not the Chinese students who have been at Union College longer, have
different responses because they have been immersed in the United State’s culture
for a longer period of time. If so, it would be interesting to track the current
freshman respondents to see if their opinions and behaviors change by their senior
year, and then to try and see if whether any differences are based in the fact that the
absence of pervasive governmental oversight prompted, or allowed them to be
more open. Unfortunately, the small number of Chinese Union College students
(twenty), with the twenty five percent return rate of five, resulted in only two
students having lived more than six months in The United States; one sophomore
with a year and a half, and one senior with three and a half years.
Analyzing the sophomore (Participant two) and senior (Participant five)
responses, I noted different answers: Q‐8, Q‐9, Q‐17, Q‐18, Q‐20 and Q‐21. On
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Question eight regarding current usage of RenRen, Participant two uses the SNS less
while Participant five uses it the same amount. I wonder if a possible reason may be
that Participant two stated he/she had access to Facebook in China, and may already
have a formed a group of online friends in China using this SNS, whereas Participant
five was not able to use Facebook in China, and may be continuing to “communicate
and share information with his/her friends in China through RenRen. Also her four
years at Union is ending in a few months and a return to China may be imminent,
absent other educational or career arrangements. Interestingly both participants
were the only users to select the answer choice (Question 6) they continue to use
RenRen to “easily communicate electronically with select groups of friends.”
Differing from Participant two and two of the freshman, Participant five’s
answers seem to suggest a little less online “openness” with regards to selecting
friends in the manner and purposes for which Facebook is normally used.
Participant answered his/her method of selecting friends on Facebook is different
than that used for RenRen, and that friend requests are accepted from fellow
students that he/she has met, which was the most restrictive choice. Participant
two, on the other hand, reported no difference in how his/her on‐line friends are
selected. Moreover, while Participant five reported belief of governmental control
on a SNS did not influence his/her decision whether or not to disclosed personal
information on‐line (question 15), yet at the same time reported that cultural
influences cause him/her to restrict the amount of personal identifiable information
made available online. Participant two agreed that governmental control did not
influence his/her decision regarding personal information disclosed online, but also

rejected the idea that cultural influences determine what personal information
he/she makes available online. Research has suggested that cultural collectivism
influences Chinese people to value group orientation over individual expression,
and that self‐discipline is commonly practiced to restrict the degree of personal
information disclosed. I suggest that governmental influences and control have
direct societal impacts on the cultural norms and influences that affect today’s
Chinese population. The fact that the Chinese government has “imprisoned more
journalists than any other country and ranks 163rd out of 168 rated countries on
press freedom,” demonstrates the willingness to impose measures to reinforce and
indoctrinate people with government selected “cultural norms” and values38.
Therefore, it is not surprising that one may remain silent due to the “uncertainty
and vagueness of the Chinese media self‐censorship regime,” and it appears
possible, that participant five has to a degree accepted such control as a matter of
course39. For example, by reflecting that he/she has not experienced a change in
how much personal information they share on Facebook while in a situation being
afforded significant freedom of expression absent government controls, and that
he/she does not believe Chinese users would communicate more openly even if
Facebook was accessible with the same degree of freedom and openness in China.
Perhaps such thinking might explain his/her reasoning to question 21’s answer, that
RenRen and Facebook do not serve the same function; use of Facebook in America is
to allow users to focus on the friends/people and gathering information about
38
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events, whereas RenRen (according to research studies) is used to focus on its
people, to enable its monitoring of users, restriction of un‐desirable information
being disseminated, and to promote Communist Party propaganda.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Several observations can be made from reviewing the questionnaires, but all
require further research before they could be presented with any measure of
meaningful validity, as the answers posed additional questions for further inquiry.
This research report of Chinese students studying at Union College is based on only
five electronically returned completed survey questionnaires out of a possible
twenty, a respectful response rate of twenty five percent (25%). The small sample
size however, does not permit any findings or conclusions to be claimed as
indicative of the opinions and actions of other Chinese students studying at Union or
the United States in general. Findings in this research study can only really be
related to this particular sample population, and perhaps used to preliminarily
suggest issues for future studies to pursue and provide grounded answers.
Respondent’s answers to the project questionnaire rejected the hypothesis
which was advanced; that the combination of American cultural influence and the
greater “freedom of expression” afforded to Facebook SNS users will affect and
change their online behavior(s). Rather, all five students answered that they were
not influenced regarding what personal information they disclose on Facebook by
the fact there is no governmental censorship of the SNS postings, and all five equally
denied that governmental control of a SNS influences their own decision whether or

not to disclose personal information. Yet, at the same time, two respondents
thought that users in China would share more information and communicate more
openly if Facebook operated in China without governmental censorship in the same
manner as the United States. This was a surprise; my review of research material
suggested that concern over governmental censorship causes online users to be
somewhat cautious regarding their postings. This impression is supported by some
personal, but minimal exposure to Chinese college students at Peking University
over a period of a few months. I expected that the survey would show that the
students, if not initially, then over time in this country would share more
information and post more openly than they had in China. This study was to
investigate the online habits of Chinese students who have been living and studying
at Union College for at least six months, and compare their primary usage of the
Social Networks RenRen and Facebook。
WHAT WAS FOUND
Several conflicting responses were observed during analysis of participant
answers to the questionnaire. [For example, while all five students claimed
governmental control over SNS’s, does not influence whether they decide to share
certain personal information online, they do not believe they self impose
restrictions]. Participant five, who had the most time in this country, actually agreed
that cultural influences do cause him/her to restrict identifiable information he/she
makes available online. This particular piece of information is noteworthy, because
while Participant five had the same initial attitude and reasons for joining RenRen

and Facebook as the other four students; his/her responses pertaining to online
restriction and personal censorship differed from the others. Participant five has
been living and residing at Union College’s campus for two to three years longer
than the other four participants, and can be expected to have had more exposure
and experience to the U.S.A.’s “individualistic culture.” It would be interesting to
assess the other respondents’ online behavior later in their college careers to see if
their answers changed over time, and study if they will be closer to Participant five’s
answers now. Participant five, along with Participant four, provided some validation
(40%) to the study hypothesis that Facebook and RenRen do not serve the same
function, as well as, Participants five and three agree, as suggested by various
research sources, that “cultural collectivism influences Chinese people to value
group orientation over individual expression, and that self‐discipline is practiced to
restrict the degree of personal information disclosed.“ The 20% differences in both
questions that disagree represent one student, so no statistical reliability can be
asserted.
The study revealed that participants one, two and three, accessed/used
Facebook while they were in China. Therefore, it seems reasonable to surmise that
these individuals may have had the ability to enter the SNS by a proxy server, and
were not then monitored or targeted by censors; or, perhaps the individuals were in
fact “spotted” by the government monitors but left alone because the manner of
their use was not considered threatening to the government’s propaganda. I
assumed that there would be more commentary provided by the students on the
questionnaire when they were responding to the survey questions; however,

according to Jens Damm, author of The Internet and the Fragmentation of Chinese
Society, the Chinese online population today is much more concerned with the
consumer lifestyle than they are politics. Damm gives a detailed explanation as to
why the Chinese government has and continues to enforce control over the media
and its content online, and, how the focus of many Chinese users today no longer
lies with China’s politics.
THE FOCUS OF TODAY’S CHINESE ONLINE POPULATION
There are many Chinese citizens who use the Internet to search for specific
online information regarding the Chinese government and its activities, which is one
primary reason why the government has imposed such rigid barriers denying
individuals access to specific online sites40. China is well aware that the online
communication world acts as a ready and efficient portal for all types of
communication: “one‐to‐one, one‐to‐many, many‐to‐many, and many‐to‐one;” such
portals allow for an interactive dialogue where everybody has the opportunity to
become his/her own publisher with only marginal costs.41” The concern of easily
accessing information through a number of different channels alone poses a
sufficient potential threat to the Chinese government. Therefore, the government
actively engages in censorship and monitoring of all online activity in order to
prevent their people from using electronic means of communication where they
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could become too big a source of leverage and power in real world politics.42 If the
mass population online did in fact become this huge source of power in their
nation’s politics, then one can predict people would surely change their behavior
online in an attempt to exercise the information they post and share.
On the other hand, perhaps similar to these particular survey users, it may be
that China’s young adult population of online users have different, and more
personal interests when using the Internet, as it is apparent that today’s Chinese
Internet users “consider social and commercial uses of the Internet much more
important that political uses.43” This would surely explain their evident lack of care
when responding to the survey questions pertaining to political controls over SNSs.
The knack for embracing information technology begins at a young age, with
children imitating their parents and interacting with those who are constantly
surrounding them with technological appliances. For instance, in January of 2002,
photographer Greg Baker captured a photograph shot of a Chinese toddler playing
with his father’s cell phone, emphasizing the fact that China is already the largest
mobile phone market in the world. Journalist Xie Fang wrote, “information is one of
the most efficient means by which a country can achieve industrialization, gain
economic benefits and increase production efficiency… the Internet is a critical
multiplier in China’s drive toward achieving an advanced level of economic
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development.44” It is amazing to see how China already has the fastest growing
network for mobile phones in the world; it would not be a surprise to see the trend
continue with Internet users. However, as the number of Internet users continues
to flourish in China, it seems obvious that the Chinese government will place
particular emphasis on promoting e‐commerce and e‐businesses, and to keep their
citizens’ attention focused on available consumer products, while continuing to
steer them away from using electronic media to advocate societal changes within
the country. It is possible that this process is already being experimented with on
social networks, and that the government is experiencing or hoping for success
among its users. That being said, this method of advertising may underlie some of
the respondent “online thinking” produced in this study. These are only
suppositions absent of demonstrable proof at this time however, despite some
preliminary potential indications and logical assessment.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the results of this experiment, and the literary reviews regarding
this topic, I wonder if the results were possibly skewed, and if these five Chinese
participant were sufficiently self‐aware of the level of internalized “self‐imposed”
restrictions that have been instilled over essentially two decades of living in China;
or, do they already reflect an openness to share more information over electronic
media. The data obtained from this study seems to run contrary to research citing
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that Chinese online users have concerns over information that they are allowed to
post online in China.
This study did not produce information suggesting the five college students
had concerns over how they use the Internet, SNS sites specifically, or what they
posted in either China or the United States. It is not surprising then, when they state
that they do not believe they act any differently since they came to Union College.
The conclusion, at least regarding the beliefs and actions of these survey
participants, would seem to be that there is no difference in how they use online
social network systems, and that they feel little cultural influence regarding how
they post and share information online; nor do they feel restricted in their decisions
regarding concern over governmental actions.
This survey has left a number of unresolved questions, and it would be
interesting to learn: 1) Will/would the results be replicated by a larger number of
Chinese students, 2) Is the reported behavior and opinions prevalent among
Chinese college students both in China as well as the United States, 3) Do the
behaviors and attitudes alter after returning to China to live, and if so are they more
restrictive, 4) It there a difference between college students and the larger adult
population, and finally, 5) Is there any difference between those users who can use
Facebook in China from those who can not and only use RenRen. Ideally, these
matters would be considered in a longitudinal study designed to learn if the
behaviors and opinions remain the same or change over time.

I noted that only Participant five, who has been in the country two years
longer than the only sophomore and three years longer than the three freshmen,
provided a number of answers “closer” to the expected responses, but this study did
not develop any information to consider what motivations and beliefs might account
for this fact. It would be interesting to learn if the behaviors and opinions of the
other four students changed and more closely matched Participant five now.
Regarding my survey results and future projections, I do not believe the data
obtained lets me make definitive conclusions and statements, nor to suggest that the
results would extend beyond this particular research project. I think that the
strongest conclusion that can now be cited is that there does not appear to be any
meaningful difference or change in how these respondent Chinese students are
influenced as users regardless of country. Production of contrasting and conflicting
answers to similar questions, insufficient data, including failure to provide
requested reasons to specific questions, as well as the fact that similar questions
received apparently contradictory and conflicting answers, impaired the assessment
results.
In summary, this survey failed to provide the type of results that would
enable me to assert that particular question results produced clean and
unambiguous findings that clarified the research question. The findings I could
discern, as reviewed in detail in the assessment portion of this report, were
somewhat unexpected, and refuted the hypothesis that the Chinese student online
user behavior on the SNS (Facebook) in this country would be different, more open
and more expressive that it was on an SNS (RenRen) in China.
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APPENDICES
1. When did you arrive at Union College?

Month: ________

Year:______________

2. How long will you be studying at Union?
Short term ___________ One year__________

Four years____________ Other______

3. What grade are you in?
Freshman________ Sophomore_______ Junior___________ Senior__________

4. Age? ____

5. Were you a user of the Chinese Social Network Site RenRen, prior to coming to
The United States as an international college student studying abroad?

No _____

Yes _______

6. How did/do you primary use RenRen? (Select all that apply)
To expand your social network and make new friends _______
Gather information about friends and events _______
Share information and express myself to friends _________
To easily communicate electronically with select groups of friends_______
Other:_________________________________________________________________________________

7. Do you continue to use RenRen while in the U.S.
Yes_____ No_______

8. After living in The United States do you still use RenRen the same amount you did
prior coming to The United States.
More ________ Less_________ The same__________

9. Were you able to use Facebook in China?
Yes ________

No_________

10. Have you become a user of the social network Facebook, since coming to The
United States as an International college student?

Yes______

No_____
Explain why you decided not to join and end the survey.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. What was your primary reason for joining Facebook? (Check one answer)
To expand your social network and make new friends _______
Gather information about friends and events _______
Share information and express myself to friends _________
To easily communicate electronically with select groups of friends_______
Because this is how American college students communicate _________
Other:_________________________________________________________________________________

12. On average how often do you visit Facebook?
Less than weekly______
Weekly ________
2 to 3 times a week _______
Daily if not more often __________

13. How do you use Facebook? (Check all the apply)
To expand your social network and make new friends _______
Gather information about friends and events _______
Share information and express myself to friends _________
To easily communicate electronically with select groups of friends_______
Other:_________________________________________________________________________________

14. Research has shown that the overwhelming majority of Facebook users in The
United States openly share personal information with on‐line friends and rely upon
the network privacy setting tools to restrict non‐authorized access. How do you
primarily control the degree of personal information you disclose?
As a personal rule, I don’t disclose personal information (Self‐Imposed
Restrictions) ________
I use the Default (standard) automatic privacy settings ___________
I make changes and customize the privacy settings to meet my needs _________

15. Does governmental control of a social networking service(s) influence your
decision whether or not you disclose your personal information?
No_______

Yes_______

16. There is no governmental censorship of Facebook postings in The United States.
Does this fact influence how you function as a Facebook user?
No________

Yes_______

I share more personal information and data_____
I use FB more frequently than I did RenRen to communicate____
I am more open to accepting and requesting friend requests____

17. Does your method of selecting friends on RenRen differ from how you choose
friends on Facebook?
No______

Yes_______

I accept requests from fellow students I have met_________
I accept requests from all Union college students_________
I use Facebook to “meet” and communicate with new friends_________

18. Research has suggested that cultural collectivism influences Chinese people to
value group orientation over individual expression, and that self‐discipline is
practiced to restrict the degree of personal information disclosed. Do you agree
cultural influences cause you to restrict the amount of personal identifiable
information you make available on‐line?
No________

Yes_________

19. Do you think that you have experienced change and now share “more”
information on Facebook than you did previously?
No_______

Yes_______

If you now share more information what factors contributed to this change?
___________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

20. Do you think if Facebook were available in China and operated in the same
manner as the United States, including no governmental control or censorship, that
Chinese users would share more personal information and communicate more
openly on‐line?
No_____

Yes _______

21. Do you think RenRen and Facebook basically serve the same function?
Yes _________ No_________
If No, state the difference:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

ABSTRACT
Research regarding Chinese online population behaviors on the Internet is
limited. Social Networking Systems, such as RenRen (“China’s Facebook”) and
Facebook, continue to become more prevalent in our world’s society and afford
individuals opportunities to publish and share personal information with others
online. This study investigates the on‐line habits of Chinese students who have been
living and studying at Union College for at least six months, and compares their
primary usage of the networks RenRen and Facebook. This research provides
preliminary results concerning how the respondents feel regarding the combination

of American cultural influence and greater “freedom of expression” afforded to
Facebook SNS users, how this affect and changes their online behavior(s). These
students come from a society that focuses on community and collectivism, as
opposed to individual pursuits, but Internet communications create more of a focus
on the individual through social networks, even in China. The Chinese government
monitors and censors all online media content. This study questions how Chinese
students, who have functioned in a society that expects self‐imposed restrictions,
behave once they are immersed in an environment where they can openly express
themselves without state censorship.

